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Generally, psychologists consider state authenticity – that is, the subjective sense of
being one’s true self – to be a unitary and unidimensional construct, such that (a) the
phenomenological experience of authenticity is thought to be similar no matter its trigger,
and (b) inauthenticity is thought to be simply the opposing pole (on the same underlying
construct) of authenticity. Using latent class analysis, we put this conceptualization to a
test. In order to avoid over-reliance on a Western conceptualization of authenticity, we
used a cross-cultural sample (N = 543), comprising participants from Western, South-
Asian, East-Asian, and South-East Asian cultures. Participants provided either a narrative
in which the described when they felt most like being themselves or one in which they
described when they felt least like being themselves. The analysis identiﬁed six distinct
classes of experiences: two authenticity classes (“everyday” and “extraordinary”), three
inauthenticity classes (“self-conscious,” “deﬂated,” and “extraordinary”), and a class
representing convergence between authenticity and inauthenticity. The classes were
phenomenologically distinct, especially with respect to negative affect, private and public
self-consciousness, and self-esteem. Furthermore, relativelymore interdependent cultures
were less likely to report experiences of extraordinary (in)authenticity than relatively more
independent cultures. Understanding the many facets of (in)authenticity may enable
researchers to connect different ﬁndings and explain why the attainment of authenticity
can be difﬁcult.
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INTRODUCTION
It is the chief point of happiness that a man is willing to be what he is.
Desiderius Erasmus (The Praise of Folly, 1511/1668).
Psychological scientists have deﬁned authenticity in a variety
of ways, with most deﬁnitions emphasizing the need for a high
degree of correspondence between a person’s behavior and her/his
“true self” (Harter, 2002; Kernis and Goldman, 2006; Wood et al.,
2008). This deﬁnition stems from a dispositional view of authen-
ticity, which has been the predominant narrative in the empirical
literature to date. More recently, however, researchers have viewed
authenticity through a situational or “state” lens (Heppner et al.,
2008; Fleeson and Wilt, 2010; Gino et al., 2010; Lenton et al.,
2013a,b). We concur with Fridhandler (1986) that “if a person
is in a state he or she must be able to feel it” (p. 170). This is espe-
cially true for state authenticity, which is thought to act as a signal
(or warning system, in the case of state inauthenticity) of one’s
current degree of self-coherence and self-integration (Erickson,
1995; Sheldon et al., 1997). Stated otherwise, state authentic-
ity (and its counterpart, inauthenticity) is a phenomenological
experience.
Authenticity is also emerging as a societal imperative. Whether
it comes from parents, politicians, celebrities, Web gurus, or col-
lege admissions advisers, the advice is similar: “just be yourself”
(Rosenbloom, 2011). This advice echoes the large number of
websites addressing “how to be yourself” (Google search: 60.2
million hits as of May 15, 2014) and the growing number of
self-help books on being “authentic” (1686 books on Amazon.com
as of May 15, 2014). In everyday life, people report experienc-
ing authenticity once or twice each week and most are strongly
motivated to attain authenticity and avoid inauthenticity (Lenton
et al., 2013a). Because so many people are seeking authenticity, it
is clearly important to improve our understanding of how it can
(and cannot) be attained.
Amongst social psychologists, authenticity refers to the per-
sonal sense that one is “real” or “true” (Harter, 2001). Prior
research, most of which has been conducted in Western cultures,
indicates that dispositional (trait) authenticity is associated with
increased positive affect, decreased negative affect, greater self-
esteem,more life-satisfaction (Goldman and Kernis, 2002), higher
well-being, and lower stress (Wood et al., 2008). State authentic-
ity has similarly positive experiential correlates: greater positive
affect, less negative affect, higher well-being, lower public self-
consciousness, increased self-esteem, more need satisfaction, and
greater alignment with the ideal self (Heppner et al., 2008; Lenton
et al., 2013a; Robinson et al., 2013). It would appear that authen-
ticity is a uniformly positive, contentment-inducing experience,
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whereas inauthenticity – authenticity’s counterpart – is a uni-
formly negative, anxiety-provoking experience. These ﬁndings
resonate with what we regard as the dominant conceptualization
of authenticity: Authenticity is an unidimensional construct, with
inauthenticity simplydenoting theopposing endof the“authentic-
ity spectrum.” But is this necessarily so? The present investigation
aimed to assess relevant evidence regarding state authenticity using
a large, cross-cultural sample.
Different strands of research suggest that not all instances of
state (in)authenticity may feel the same, as triggering circum-
stances vary. For example, people feel inauthentic if they are
required to manage emotional expressions for their job (e.g.,
“service with a smile”; Hochschild, 1983) or when wearing coun-
terfeit sunglasses (Gino et al., 2010). Also, whereas the experience
of authenticity is primarily associated with fun and familiarity,
some individuals report authenticity even when facing personal
difﬁculties. Similarly, although the experience of inauthenticity
is largely associated with feeling judged by others, some indi-
viduals report inauthenticity when being helpful (Lenton et al.,
2013a). The phenomenological experiences of (in)authenticity,
then, may be more complex than mean scale scores (e.g., average
positive affect, average public self-consciousness) convey. Stated
otherwise, the “inauthenticity” felt when regularly falsifying one’s
emotional expressions may be qualitatively – not just quantita-
tively – different from that felt when brieﬂy donning counterfeit
sunglasses.
To illustrate this idea further, self-awareness has been theorized
both to increase (Kernis and Goldman, 2006; Wood et al., 2008)
and decrease (Turner and Billings, 1991; Leary et al., 2006) authen-
ticity. Kernis and Goldman (2006) suggested that the authentic
individual is consciously aware of her/his multi-faceted (yet con-
tradictory) nature and this awareness facilitates a cohesive self. In
contrast, Leary et al. (2006) argued that a person can behave more
naturally and make better progress toward her/his goals when
self-awareness is lowered. Yet, in our earlier work investigating
what state authenticity feels like, the average level of private self-
consciousness was at the scale’s mid-point (Lenton et al., 2013a),
apparently supporting neither hypothesis. In that work, however,
we examined (in)authenticity as if it were a unitary construct.
Thus, this result may indicate evidence for both hypotheses, if
there are (at least) two distinct types of authenticity: one low, one
high in private self-consciousness.
To examine such possibilities, we conducted a latent class anal-
ysis (LCA) on previously collected cross-cultural data. LCA is a
powerful tool for revealing hidden data patterns, as it “aim(s) to
uncover unobserved heterogeneity in a population and to ﬁnd
substantively meaningful groups [..] that are similar in their
responses” (Nylund et al., 2007, p. 536). We address the distinc-
tion between group and construct heterogeneity in further detail
in the section “Discussion.” Researchers have speculated (Gold-
man and Kernis, 2002) that the sense of authenticity facilitates
self-coherence and well-being. But what if (in)authenticity is a
multi-faceted experience? If so, not all instances of (in)authenticity
may have the same beneﬁts for well-being and the self. Addi-
tionally, if subtype experiences exist, LCA may identify critical
experiential aspects that are common to all forms of authentic-
ity or inauthenticity. For example, perhaps high positive affect
pervades all instances of authenticity, but high need satisfaction
does not. This would suggest that positive affect is a necessary
feature of the authenticity experience, whereas need satisfaction
is not.
Furthermore, what if cultures differ in terms of which facets
they experience? It is possible that beneﬁts associated with authen-
ticity – such as higher self-esteem, higher positive affect, and lower
negative affect (Goldman and Kernis, 2002), as well as decreased
stress (Wood et al., 2008) – are restricted to cultures valuing indi-
vidualism (Robinson et al., 2013). Western cultures promote a
relatively independent view of the self, whereas Eastern cultures
promote a relatively interdependent view of the self (Markus and
Kitayama, 1991). Authenticity, which is generally conceptualized
as the sense of a distinct true or real self, seemsmore closely related
to the Western view of the self, suggesting, perhaps, that the expe-
rience of (and search for) authenticity is a by-product of Western
ideals. Alternatively, authenticity may actually relate to one’s inter-
nal cultural norms (Sherman et al., 2012). For example, EastAsians
(e.g., Chinese, Japanese) perceive personality as a malleable entity,
whereas Westerners (e.g., Americans, British) perceive it as a ﬁxed
entity (Chiu et al., 1997). It would follow that East Asians may feel
more authentic when adapting to and Westerners when resisting
social pressures. In other words, individuals from both cultures
may experience authenticity and reap its beneﬁts, but perhaps
under different circumstances.
Few studies of authenticity have adopted a cross-cultural per-
spective (Robinson et al., 2013; Slabu et al., in press), let alone
been conducted outside of Western cultures (but see Ito and
Kodama, 2007, 2008). Robinson et al. (2013) did not assess directly
the phenomenology of authenticity, but they discovered that
the (trait) authenticity–well-being relation was similarly strong
across three cultures (USA, England, Russia). In our cross-cultural
(USA, India, China, Singapore) investigation, we found that cul-
ture moderated the subjective experience of state (in)authenticity
(Slabu et al., in press). For example, Indian participants were
more likely than their counterparts to report experiencing higher
private self-consciousness when feeling authentic, but less likely
to report experiencing increased self-esteem in the same situa-
tion. Again, however, in the Slabu et al. (in press) investigation
we assumed authenticity to be a unitary experiential construct;
that is, we averaged across a wide array of experiences to assess
how authenticity and inauthenticity differ from one another.
If different cultures experience qualitatively distinct types of
(in)authenticity, then the authenticity–well-being relation uncov-
ered by Robinson et al. (2013) likely has a different foundation
across cultures (i.e., authenticity facilitates well-being for differ-
ent reasons). Furthermore, it would suggest that cultures vary
in their conceptualizations of what it means to “feel like my
true self.” Thus, the current study also adds to the emerg-
ing literature examining if and how authenticity differs across
cultures.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
We recruited participants from one of three sources: (a) Univer-
sity students in the UK, Singapore, and China (the latter two via
local contacts); (b) persons visiting our own or other websites
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listing psychological studies; and (c) persons registered with Ama-
zon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), a global website that offers online
tasks for pay (in our study: $3–$4, n= 325). Individuals frommore
than 60 countries responded, but for most countries the number
of participants was insufﬁcient for an LCA analysis (e.g., 56%
of the countries had only 1 response). Additionally, we excluded
participants who indicated that they were resident in a coun-
try other than their country of origin for more than 5 years,
because immersion into the host culture likely dilutes the orig-
inal cultural socialization (Masgoret and Ward, 2006). The ﬁnal
data consisted of 523 individuals from two samples comprising
four cultural groups: (a) Western, English-speaking countries
(n=242; in descending frequency: United States,UnitedKingdom,
Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Ireland); (b) South-Asian coun-
tries (n = 82; India, Pakistan); (c) East-Asian countries (n = 105;
China, Japan); (d) South-East Asian countries (n = 94; Singapore,
Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand). Elsewhere we have
reported analyses using data from the same participant samples
(Lenton et al., 2013a; Slabu et al., in press). Here, we combined
and analyzed those data (along with data previously unreported)
using LCA.
Sample 1
This sample comprised 84 volunteers. It included 64 female and
20 male participants (Mage = 30.90 years, SDage = 12.79), nearly all
from Western, English-speaking countries (one from East-Asia).
Sample 2
This sample comprised 439 volunteers. It included 272 female and
167 male participants (Mage = 26.44 years, SDage = 8.76 years).
Given that the cultural make-up of this sample was diverse, we
asked non-native English speakers to rate their English proﬁciency
in reading and writing on a 5-point scale (1 = not at all ﬂuent,
5 = perfectly ﬂuent). Most participants from Western (96.2%) and
South-East Asian (64.9%) countries were native English speak-
ers. English was a native language for approximately one-quarter
(25.6%) of South-Asian and 1.0% of East-Asian participants. Of
non-native English speakers, 100%ofWesterners, 97.0%of South-
East Asians, 100% of South-Asians, and 92.2% of East-Asians
reported having a fair or better English proﬁciency (at least 3 on
the 5-point scale reported above).
PROCEDURE
Participants completed anonline survey (in English) and theywere
randomly assigned to one of two conditions that only differedwith
respect to the memories to be narrated. In the ﬁrst condition, par-
ticipants were instructed to describe an event during which “you
felt most like your true or real self ” (most-me condition), whereas,
in the second condition, they were asked to describe an event
during which “you felt least like your true or real self ” (least-me
condition). All participants then rated that event (1 = strongly
disagree, 7 = strongly agree) on: (a) positive and negative affect
(Kercher,1992, short-formPANAS for Sample 1; Thompson,2007,
international short-form PANAS for Sample 2); (b) self-esteem
(Rosenberg, 1965); (c) private (nine items) and public (three
items) self-consciousness (Fenigstein et al., 1975); (d) ideal-self
overlap (10 attributes from Self-Attributes Questionnaire – e.g.,
attractiveness, humor; Pelham and Swann, 1989); and (e) need
satisfaction (one item per each of 10 psychological needs – e.g.,
autonomy, competence; Sheldon et al., 2001). Instructions were
adapted so that participants rated their psychological state in that
situation (e.g., state self-esteem) rather than generally (e.g., trait
self-esteem). All measures were reliable (Cronbach’s αs ≥ 0.83).
RESULTS
DATA PREPARATION
Given that scale usage can depend on culture (e.g., acquies-
cence, extreme responding; Van Vaerenbergh and Thomas, 2013),
we controlled for culture-based response biases. This is espe-
cially important when employing analytic methods that rely upon
correlations: LCA partly works to identify classes by assessing cor-
relations among indicators (Magidson and Vermunt, 2004). If
response biases are not controlled, conclusions may be invalid
(Fischer and Milfont, 2010; Van Vaerenbergh and Thomas, 2013).
Speciﬁcally, we did not want classes to reﬂect varieties of response
styles but, rather, varieties of authenticity or inauthenticity
experiences.
Regression analyses showed that culture (Western, SouthAsian,
East Asian, South-East Asian) had signiﬁcant effects on extreme
response style, F(3,519) = 16.85, p = 0.001, R2 = 0.09, and acqui-
escent response style, F(3,519) = 21.86, p = 0.001,R2 = 0.11 (ana-
lytic details available upon request). Accordingly, we standardized
the indicators within each culture (Fischer and Milfont, 2010) by
subtracting their culture’s mean across all items from participants’
raw scale scores for each indicator and then dividing by their cul-
ture’s standard deviation across all items [i.e., (scale-meanindividual
minus all-item-meanculture)/all-item-SDculture].
MAIN ANALYSES
Using Latent Gold® 4.5, we tested a model with the standardized
experiential ratings as indicators (predictors). Table 1 provides the
results1. We examined the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC;
Schwartz, 1978), the Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC), a vari-
ant of the AIC criterion (called AIC3, with 3 as penalizing factor)
to assess model ﬁt. For all these information criteria (IC), lower
number indicates better ﬁt (Magidson andVermunt, 2004; Nylund
et al., 2007). However, we note that simulation studies considering
LCA models conﬁrmed that the BIC is the most reliable of the
ICs across various model permutations (Lukociene et al., 2010; for
an overview, see Fonseca and Cardoso, 2007; Nylund et al., 2007).
Additionally, we report entropy, which is measured on a 0–1 scale,
with a value of 1 indicating that participants are perfectly classi-
ﬁed into latent classes. In general, higher entropy values reﬂect a
more accurate classiﬁcation and the six-class model had a value of
0.918. The six-class model also possessed the lowest BIC,AIC, and
AIC3 followed by the ﬁve-class model. Additionally, the difference
between the BIC models was greater than 2.0, indicating a “posi-
tive” difference in ﬁt (Raftery, 1995); hence, we chose the six-class
model.
To begin to characterize the six-class model, we assigned each
case to the class for which it yielded the highest membership
1We ran the analysis 10 times to preclude the possibility of identifying a local
rather than global solution (Nylund et al., 2007). The values shown in Table 1
were replicated and thus reﬂect a stable (global) solution.
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Table 1 | Latent class analysis statistics.
Number of
classes
Log-
likelihood
BIC AIC AIC3 Number of
parameters
Composition of best-fitting model
1 −8316.92 16721.47 16661.83 16675.83 14
2 −7798.52 15778.56 15655.04 15684.04 29
3 −7614.30 15504.02 15316.59 15360.59 44
4 −7513.21 15395.73 15144.42 15203.42 59
5 −7440.25 15343.70 15028.50 15102.50 74
6 −7390.37 15337.85* 14958.74* 15047.74* 89 Most-me Class 1 (n=159; 81.8% Most-me):
W=39.6%, EA=23.9%, SA=20.1%, SEA=16.4%
Least-me Class 1 (n=105; 80.0% Least-me):
W=51.4%, EA=15.2%, SA=15.2%, SEA=18.1%
Least-me Class 2 (n=79; 70.9% Least-me):
W=40.5%, EA=25.3%, SA=11.4%, SEA=22.8%
Most-me Class 2 (n=67; 95.5% Most-me):
W=61.2%, EA=11.9%, SA=3.0%, SEA=23.9%
Least-me Class 3 (n=62; 96.8% Least-me):
W=64.5%, EA=11.3%, SA=11.3%, SEA=12.9%
Converging Class (n=51; 51.0% Least-me):
W=23.5%, EA=31.4%, SA=31.4%, SEA=13.7%
7 −7361.61 15374.21 104
8 −7325.14 15395.17 119
9 −7301.33 15441.44 134
10 −7270.84 15474.35 149
Bold denotes the two lowest BIC, AIC, and AIC3 values and the asterisk denotes the lowest BIC, AIC, and AIC3 values in the column. In the right-most column, the
identiﬁed classes are listed in descending order by size. Furthermore, W refers to Westerners, EA refers to East Asians, SA refers to South Asians, and SEA refers to
South-East Asians.
probability. Then, we compared the class assignments to each
narrative’s original condition (least-me vs. most-me). Table 1
reports the size and narrative composition of each class (e.g.,
the largest class comprised 159 cases, 81.8% of which were most-
me narratives). The analysis identiﬁed two types of authenticity
experiences, three types of inauthenticity experiences, and one
class for which the experiences of authenticity and inauthenticity
overlapped (henceforth the converging class).
Next, we compared the classes’ experiential proﬁles (Figure 1).
Consistent with previous ﬁndings, on average, inauthenticity
classes were higher in NA, lower in PA, lower in ideal self-overlap,
lower in need satisfaction, and lower in self-esteem than authen-
ticity classes; two of three inauthenticity classes were also higher in
public self-consciousness than authenticity classes (Lenton et al.,
2013a). The converging class generally fell between the authen-
ticity and inauthenticity classes, with scores around each scale’s
midpoint. Crucially, signiﬁcant differences emerged among the
two authenticity and three inauthenticity classes.
One-way ANOVAs demonstrated that the three inauthenticity
classes differed with respect to all seven indicators (Figure 1). Post
hoc analyses (Bonferroni) revealed that the classes were signiﬁ-
cantly different from one another at p < 0.05 across the seven
indicators except that Least-me Classes 1 and 3 did not differ in
NA, Classes 1 and 2 did not differ in ideal self-overlap, and Classes
2 and 3 did not differ in private self-consciousness.
We label Least-me Class 3 experiences extraordinary inauthen-
ticity, as they involved much more NA than PA, very little (if
any) need satisfaction and self-esteem, and strong public self-
consciousness. Least-me Class 1 also was associated with relatively
high NA and, in fact, the strongest public and private self-
consciousness, but PA, self-esteem, and need satisfaction were
not entirely absent. Thus, we label this class self-conscious inau-
thenticity. Least-me Class 2 was an experientially deﬂated class:
NA and public self-consciousness were not especially high, but
neither were PA, need satisfaction, and private self-consciousness.
These narratives were associated with a modicum of self-esteem
and ideal self-overlap (perhaps due to the higher number of
most-me narratives contained in this class), but still lower than
either of the most-me experiences. We label this class deﬂated
inauthenticity.
The two most-me classes were more similar to one another, as
they were associated with equally strong PA, ideal self-overlap, and
need satisfaction. Most-me Class 2 (vs. Most-me Class 1) narra-
tives, however, were rated signiﬁcantly lower onNAandpublic and
private self-consciousness, andhigher on self-esteem. That is, these
narratives represented very affectively positive events with little
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FIGURE 1 | Six-class experiential profile (means and standard errors).
public self-consciousness. Hence, we refer to the two sub-classes
as everyday vs. extraordinary forms of authenticity.
Belowwe provide exemplar narratives from each class to convey
the wide variety of situations described by participants.
Least-me Class 1 (self-conscious inauthenticity)
[...] I failed to get a scholarship and my father was accused of [rape]. I
tried to ignore it and pretend I [was] not affected but it wasn’t the real
me. I just [portrayed myself] to be someone who is strong. I focused myself
[on] work and never tried to confess to someone except to God.
When I found out I was cheated [on] by my husband, that’s [when] I felt
the least me. Because it did not [happen] only once but 3 times. The text
in his phone was my evidence of what he did to me.
Least-me Class 2 (deﬂated inauthenticity)
At [some] relatives’ place [...] whom I only meet once a year. I grew up
being a shy and quiet boy. However, with my experiences ever since I was
16 years old (I’m 27 now), I have become more outspoken and interactive.
Nevertheless, I remain the shy and quiet boy that my relatives know me
to be. I can’t become the person I am today, outspoken and interactive, all
of sudden around my distant relatives. As such, I remain quiet to them,
only speaking when spoken to. This is different from my life where I would
usually be the one to start a conversation.
I currently feel the “least” me. I just moved [...and] I have been taken out
of time and place. My physical environment is different. [...] My friends
aren’t accessible in the physical form like they were in the past. I have to
learn how to ﬁnd my way in this city. I also need a new bank, doctor,
dentist, pharmacy, grocery store, apt. utilities, etc. I am going to a new
school. I was accustomed to a certain life that I feel that I will have to, to
an extent, build up again. This makes me a bit sad because those common
routine things are not there anymore. [...]
Least-me Class 3 (extraordinary inauthenticity)
[...]Today when I was on my lunch break a girl walking towards me
dropped down on her knees and put her hands together. She didn’t say
anything but she closed her eyes and put her hands together. She looked
like she hadn’t eaten or showered, she also looked like she was high on
some kind of drug. I stopped and looked at her and then I walked away
and I feel absolutely terrible about it. I can’t get the image out of my mind
of the way that she looked and the way that she fell on her knees. I feel like
a horrible person and am disgusted with myself that I walked away. [...]
I felt the least likemewhen involved in an intimate relationship that ticked
all the right boxes [...] yet everything felt, wrong, I felt disconnected, I felt
fake, I felt (despite my boyfriend’s devotion and attention) that there was
something essentially wrong about me/ with me. That I was not who I
had thought I was, that I didn’t know who I was, that maybe I never
had. [...] I wanted to stop pretending, but I didn’t even know what I
was pretending [...] I ended the relationship [...]and strived in a strange
dissociated state at building a musical/creative community [...] I was
looking for like souls, but I didn’t know what it was about me that was
different. Years [passed]...and one day I was out dancing with friends and
saw/felt the presence of another across the room. I looked at him and knew
he was intersex, and that I was also! Over the past year personal/ family
archaeology has revealed the history of hidden difference, and explained
the weight of horriﬁed unexplained shame that was projected on me from
my family. I have been liberated [...]We close our eyes to what we don’t
expect to see - but now my eyes are open and I am free to be me without
apology or shame.
Most-me Class 1 (everyday authenticity)
This current time in my life I feel I have really reached the real me and
found myself. I am living on my own, with my own puppy in which I have
done an amazing job training. I live alone, and pay my bills on my own,
and go to school. I love having a place of my own, and my own things that
I have worked hard for, even if it means not having extra money.
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I am bisexual, but not one that is openly out. So whenever I am with [my
signiﬁcant other], I feel that I can be myself. It’s as if there is nothing that
she doesn’t know about. We connect on an emotional level wherein some-
times, words are not needed between us. It doesn’t have to be anywhere
speciﬁc. The fact that I am with her is enough. We laugh at the same
things, we enjoy the same movies, we read the same books, or we crave
the same food. It’s as if we are two parts of a whole. I know that there is
nothing that I can’t tell her, and for that I am grateful.
Most-me Class 2 (extraordinary authenticity)
[...] I felt most me when I was 20 years of age ... about year after I had
suffered a head injury and had to wear a plastic mask that burn victims
wear for 6 months. That experience brought me to a place where I didn’t
give a shit what anyone thought of me. I guess to pinpoint an actual event,
I would say... I traveled to Europe on my own and traveled for a summer
on my own. I talked with everyone and asked everyone questions... I tried
and practiced the language of the country I was without concern with if I
sounded dumb or not exact. [...] I embraced life.
I was on holiday in Majorca with my parents. I was 19 years old. I
remember being so happy to be there, and had such a sense of freedom
that I spontaneously burst into song. I sang loudly and proudly for all to
hear and was not bothered that everyone was looking at me. I didn’t feel
silly, just absolutely delighted to be there. It only lasted a few minutes, but
it felt magniﬁcent. I have never felt so happy and natural in all my life!
Converging Class
Traveling with a group of friends and without the company of my parents
for the ﬁrst time when I was 21. I could do what I want[ed] without being
mindful of my parents’ views.
I’ve moved to California where I have no friends and no family. I feel [...]
alone and try to accommodate my signiﬁcant other because I have no one
else in my life. I have never been one to do this.
DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSES
To determine whether participants were distributed differently
across the classes by their demographics, we conducted a multi-
nomial logistic regression. We entered “Class” as the categorical
dependent variable (six levels, with the most populous class –
everyday authenticity – set as the reference category), with sample
(1 vs. 2), gender (male vs. female), age (standardized), and culture
(four levels, with the most populous culture, Western, set as the
reference category) entered as predictors. Culture [X2(15)= 42.04,
p = 0.001] and age [X2(5) = 13.66, p = 0.018] were signiﬁcant pre-
dictors of class assignment, but sample [X2(15) = 2.76, p = 0.737]
and gender [X2(15) = 7.61, p = 0.179] were not.
Table 1 describes the distribution of cultures across classes. We
list signiﬁcant (<0.05) comparisons only. East Asians (vs. West-
erners) reported fewer experiences of extraordinary authenticity
(Odds Ratio or OR = 0.33, 95% CI = 0.13–0.81) and extraordinary
inauthenticity (OR = 0.25, 95% CI = 0.10–0.64). South Asians
(vs. Westerners) also reported fewer experiences of extraordinary
authenticity (OR = 0.09, 95% CI = 0.02–0.43).
With respect to age, there was one signiﬁcant effect: the con-
verging class comprised signiﬁcantly younger participants than the
everyday authenticity class (OR = 0.56, 95% CI = 0.35–0.90).
DISCUSSION
Authenticity and inauthenticity come in different ﬂavors, but
remain discriminable. The LCA showed that, whereas PA, ideal
self-overlap, self-esteem, and need satisfaction strongly distin-
guished authenticity from inauthenticity (these were lower in all
three inauthenticity classes than in both authenticity classes), the
different ﬂavors of each authenticity and inauthenticity owedmore
to variability in NA and public and private self-consciousness.
The experiential hallmark of state authenticity is strong PA,
ideal self-overlap, need satisfaction, and self-esteem, as both
forms of authenticity possessed these attributes (and extraordi-
nary authenticity possessed even higher self-esteem than everyday
authenticity). State inauthenticity, in contrast, bore no experien-
tial hallmark, as the three classes differed on all seven indicators.
Indeed, the constructs responsible for discriminating authentic-
ity from inauthenticity also helped differentiate among the three
inauthenticity classes. Speciﬁcally, some forms of inauthentic-
ity do not necessitate low PA, ideal self-overlap, self-esteem, or
need satisfaction. This is surprising given the presumed strong
link between inauthenticity and negative outcomes (Hochschild,
1983; Goldman andKernis, 2002; Heppner et al., 2008;Wood et al.,
2008). Future work might examine how people buffer mood and
self-esteem from certain inauthenticity experiences.
That negative affect strongly differentiated among types of
authenticity and inauthenticity is not surprising, given that affect
is known to inﬂuence the self more generally (Sedikides, 1992).
NA was at its nadir in extraordinary authenticity, but strong in
extraordinary inauthenticity. Yet, one authenticity class (everyday)
was associated with as much negative affect as one inauthentic-
ity class (deﬂated). Thus, contrary to the implications of prior
ﬁndings, the relation between negative affect and felt authen-
ticity is not perfectly linear (Heppner et al., 2008; Lenton et al.,
2013b).
Public self-consciousness also differed between the authentic-
ity and inauthenticity subtypes. Although the extraordinary forms
of each authenticity and inauthenticity represent opposite ends
of the public self-consciousness spectrum, not all experiences of
authenticity are without public self-consciousness and, conversely,
not all experiences of inauthenticity are imbued with public
self-consciousness. We speculate that public self-consciousness
and negative affect together may have a causal relation with
(in)authenticity, as negative affect – especially anxiety – often coin-
cides with public self-consciousness (Carver and Scheier, 1986).
That is, it is possible that high public self-consciousness may
lead to negative affect, or that their co-presence is sufﬁcient to
induce extraordinary inauthenticity. Conversely, when both neg-
ative affect and public self-consciousness are distinctly absent,
extraordinary authenticity may be enabled. Future research could
examine the interplay between public self-consciousness and neg-
ative affect in inducing state (in)authenticity, as this study cannot
disentangle potential causes from effects.
Additionally, everyday authenticity was associated with mod-
erate public self-consciousness and strong positive affect. Hence,
public self-consciousnesswithout concomitant negative affectmay
not produce the inauthenticity experience. Still further, public
self-consciousness and negative affect are not necessary for inau-
thenticity: Deﬂated inauthenticity possessed only modest levels of
each. Future work might examine the interactive effects of these
constructs on state authenticity.
The ﬁndings provide support for one of the hypotheses
concerning the private self-consciousness–authenticity relation:
Everyday authenticity was associated with much higher private
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self-consciousness than was extraordinary authenticity, and the
former was also higher in private self-consciousness than two
of the three inauthenticity classes. Stated otherwise, one form
of authenticity is indeed associated with introspection and self-
examination (Kernis and Goldman, 2006; Wood et al., 2008). Yet,
everyday authenticity also was associated with increased public
self-consciousness. This pattern suggests that everyday authentic-
ity is more social than extraordinary authenticity and, as such,
may correspond to Kernis and Goldman’s (2006) “relational ori-
entation”component of dispositional authenticity. In other words,
everyday authenticity may represent the phenomenological expe-
rience of reﬂecting on and disclosing aspects of oneself (good and
bad) to others.
The existence of the converging class indicates that the phe-
nomenological experience of authenticity may not always be
different from that of inauthenticity. Examination of narratives
in the converging class showed that many highlighted contrast-
ing emotions (e.g., an inauthenticity narrative describing the
person getting excited when discussing friends’ problems; an
authenticity narrative describing the person’s uncertainty regard-
ing their suitability for a new job, but then discovering they
were perfectly suited to it). Thus, while deﬂation (ﬂatter affect)
was associated with inauthenticity, truly ambivalent emotions
are more difﬁcult to classify. The implications for well-being
of these types of (in)authenticity experiences remain to be
determined.
We also note that the experiential proﬁle of some instances
of authenticity resembled more closely inauthenticity and vice
versa (though the latter occurred less frequently). Conspicu-
ously, these “miscategorizations” were less likely to occur for the
extraordinary than the non-extraordinary forms of inauthenticity
and authenticity (Table 1). The extraordinary forms were more
“uncontaminated” and, thus, arguably represent the prototypical
experience, at least for Westerners. Still, similar to the exis-
tence of the converging class, these “miscategorizations” suggest
that authenticity and inauthenticity are not necessarily experi-
entially different from one another (at least not on the set of
relevant variables we assessed) and, thus, should not be considered
opposites.
Although culture plays a role in state authenticity, that role is
not all-encompassing (Robinson et al., 2013; Slabu et al., in press).
Speciﬁcally, all four cultures were represented in every class, but
not uniformly so. East Asians and South Asians were less likely
to report extraordinary authenticity; East-Asians also reported
signiﬁcantly fewer instances of extraordinary inauthenticity. In
contrast, Westerners’ narratives were relatively over-represented
in these two classes. Thus, although there was considerable over-
lap across the cultures, different cultures also possessed somewhat
distinct conceptualizations of what “being my true self” feels
like.
The cross-cultural results are not the result of our Western par-
ticipants having a more extreme response style, as we adjusted
for this prior to the LCA. These culture effects may instead
reﬂect differences in self-construal (Triandis, 1995). The study
from which many of our cross-cultural participants emanated
(Slabu et al., in press) found that Singaporeans (who made up
most of our South-East Asian sample) were less independent
than their counterparts from the US (who made up most of
our Western sample), but more independent than their Chi-
nese and Indian counterparts (who made up most of our
East-Asian and South-Asian samples, respectively). That is, our
South-Asian and East-Asian participants were strongly inter-
dependent and the Westerners strongly independent, with the
South-East Asians in between. Valuing individual uniqueness
and autonomy over group harmony and achievement may put
one at special risk of extraordinary inauthenticity, but may also
make one more likely to experience extraordinary authentic-
ity.
The ﬁndings may be limited by the retrospective nature of
our methods, as reconstructive memory is generally subject to
distortion (Loftus and Palmer, 1974). For example, individuals’
enduring goals or motives shape their autobiographical memo-
ries (McAdams, 1993; Sedikides and Green, 2009). To the extent
that the same is true of our participants’ ratings, the results
in part amplify attributes of the “most-me” or “least-me” sto-
ries in line with their goal. Future research might examine
whether in situ experiences of authenticity and inauthenticity
also comprise distinct sub-type experiences and if these differ
cross-culturally.
An alternative interpretation of these results is that they reﬂect
differences in personality rather than in types of authenticity expe-
riences. Althoughwe cannot rule out this possibility – after all, LCA
is more commonly used to differentiate individuals rather than
states of being (Nylund et al., 2007; Jung and Wickrama, 2008)
– we argue that it is at least equally plausible (if not more so)
that the authenticity and inauthenticity classes represent different
types of experiences that nearly anyone can have given the “right”
circumstances. We know, for example, that state (in)authenticity
is separable from trait (in)authenticity. That is, regardless of their
level of trait authenticity, individuals experience both authentic-
ity and inauthenticity, and such experiences occur with regularity
(Lenton et al., 2013a). Furthermore, we instructed participants
to recount a single episode of either authenticity or inauthentic-
ity and to rate that episode on several dimensions; we did not
instruct them to describe how they generally experience authen-
ticity or inauthenticity. Stated otherwise, we asked participants to
consider and evaluate only a single, speciﬁc experience of authen-
ticity (or inauthenticity), not how authenticity (or inauthenticity)
feels regardless of its antecedents or context. Finally, there is no
reason to believe that these experiential proﬁles aremutually exclu-
sive, especially in light of the types of situations that participants
described. That is, “feeling self-conscious when among strangers
at a party” does not preclude that one might experience more
extraordinary inauthenticity in a different situation or that would
experience either everyday or extraordinary authenticity in still
other circumstances as well. Taken together, while some individ-
uals may be more likely than others to report experiences of one
or another class of (in)authenticity, the procedures of our stud-
ies make it more likely that the classes represent different types
of (in)authenticity experiences than of people, and the extant
literature reinforces this point.
Overall, the current results demonstrate that (in)authenticity
is not phenomenologically unitary, as we uncovered distinct types
of experiences. The implications of experientially distinct types of
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authenticity and inauthenticity for well-being constitute an excit-
ing research avenue. For example, deﬂated inauthenticity actually
may be more deleterious than extraordinary inauthenticity if
the former occurs more frequently or is not as easily explained
away. Furthermore, this multifaceted view of authenticity may
be important in shaping people’s expectations for when they
have successfully attained their “true self.” Seeking to experience
everyday authenticity or avoid only extraordinary inauthentic-
ity may decrease the perceived difﬁculty of being one’s true
self.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors thankPeteYule for hisweb-design skills, andViolaMa,
Mark Khei, Ying-Yi Hong, and Janice Yap for assistance with data
collection. This research was supported by Economic and Social
Research Council grant #RES-062-23-2595 to Alison Lenton and
Constantine Sedikides.
REFERENCES
Carver, C. S., and Scheier, M. F. (1986). “Functional and dysfunctional responses
to anxiety: the interaction between expectancies and self-focused attention,” in
Self-Related Cognitions in Anxiety andMotivation, ed. R. Schwarzer (Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum), 111–141.
Chiu, C.,Hong,Y., andDweck, C. S. (1997). Lay dispositionism and implicit theories
of personality. J. Personal. Soc. Psychol. 73, 19–30. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.73.1.19
Erickson, R. J. (1995). The importance of authenticity for self and society. Symbo.
Interact. 18, 121–144. doi: 10.1525/si.1995.18.2.121
Fenigstein, A., Scheier, M. F., and Buss, A. H. (1975). Public and private self-
consciousness: assessment and theory. J. Consult. Clin. Psychol. 43, 522–527. doi:
10.1037/h0076760
Fischer, R., and Milfont, T. L. (2010). Standardization in psychological research. Int.
J. Psychol. Res. 3, 89–97.
Fleeson, W., and Wilt, J. (2010). The relevance of Big Five trait content in behavior
to subjective authenticity: do high levels of within-person behavioral variability
undermine or enable authenticity achievement? J. Personal. 78, 1353–1382. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-6494.2010.00653.x
Fonseca, J. R. S., and Cardoso, M. G. M. S. (2007). Mixture-model cluster analysis
using information theoretical criteria. Intell. Data Anal. 1, 155–173.
Fridhandler, B. M. (1986). Conceptual note on state, trait, and the state-trait
distinction. J. Personal. Soc. Psychol. 50, 169–174. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.50.
1.169
Gino, F., Norton, M., and Ariely, D. (2010). The counterfeit self: the deceptive costs
of faking it. Psychol. Sci. 21, 712–720. doi: 10.1177/0956797610366545
Goldman, B., and Kernis, M. (2002). The role of authenticity in healthy psycho-
logical functioning and subjective well-being. Ann. Am. Psychother. Assoc. 5,
18–20.
Harter, S. (2001). The Construction of Self: A Developmental Perspective. New York,
NY: Guilford Press.
Harter, S. (2002). “Authenticity,” inHandbook of Positive Psychology, eds C. R. Snyder
and S. J. Lopez (London: Oxford University Press), 382–394.
Heppner, W. L., Kernis, M. H., Nezlek, J. B., Foster, J., Lakey, C. E., and Goldman,
B. M. (2008). Within-person relationships between daily self-esteem, need satis-
faction, and authenticity. Psychol. Sci. 19, 1140–1145. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.
2008.02215.x
Hochschild, A. R. (1983). The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Ito, M., and Kodama, M. (2007). Sense of authenticity, affectivity, and cultural
construal of the self among Japanese university students. Psychol. Rep. 100, 83–86.
doi: 10.2466/pr0.100.1.83-86
Ito, M., and Kodama, M. (2008). Important subjective life experiences and sense of
authenticity: retrospective survey among Japanese university students. Psychol.
Rep. 103, 695–700. doi: 10.2466/PRO.103.3.695-700
Jung, T., and Wickrama, K. A. S. (2008). An introduction to latent class growth
analysis and growth mixture modeling. Soc. Personal. Psychol. Compass 2, 302–
317. doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2007.00054.x
Kercher, K. (1992). Assessing subjective well-being in the old-old. Res. Aging 14,
131–167. doi: 10.1177/0164027592142001
Kernis, M., and Goldman, B. (2006). A multicomponent conceptualization of
authenticity: theory and research. Adv. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 38, 284–357. doi:
10.1016/S0065-2601(06)38006-9
Leary, M. R., Adams, C. E., and Tate, E. B. (2006). Hypo-egoic self-regulation:
exercising self-control by diminishing the inﬂuence of the self. J. Personal. 74,
1803–1831. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.2006.00429.x
Lenton, A. P., Bruder, M., Slabu, L., and Sedikides, C. (2013a). How does “being
real” feel? The experience of state authenticity. J. Personal. 81, 276–279. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-6494.2012.00805.x
Lenton, A., Slabu, L., Sedikides, C., and Power, K. (2013b). I feel good, therefore I
am real: testing the causal inﬂuence of mood on state authenticity. Cogn. Emot.
27, 1202–1224. doi: 10.1080/02699931.2013.778818
Loftus, E. F., and Palmer, J. C. (1974). Reconstruction of automobile destruc-
tion: an example of the interaction between language and memory. J.
Verbal Learning Verbal Behav. 13, 585–589. doi: 10.1016/S0022-5371(74)
80011-3
Lukociene, O., Varriale, R., and Vermunt, J. K. (2010). The simultaneous deci-
sion(s) about the number of lower- and higher-level classes in multilevel latent
class analysis. Sociol. Methodol. 40, 247–283. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9531.2010.
01231.x
Magidson, J., and Vermunt, J. K. (2004). “Latent class models,” in Handbook of
Quantitative Methodology for the Social Sciences, ed. D. Kaplan (Newbury Park,
CA: Sage), 175–198.
Markus, H. R., and Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: implications
for cognition, emotion, and motivation. Psychol. Rev. 98, 224–253. doi:
10.1037/0033-295X.98.2.224
Masgoret, A.-M., and Ward, C. (2006). “Culture learning approach to accul-
turation,” in The Cambridge Handbook of Acculturation Psychology, eds D. L.
Sam and J. W. Berry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 58–79. doi:
10.1017/CBO9780511489891.008
McAdams, D. P. (1993). The Stories We Live By: Personal Myths and the Making of
the Self. New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.
Nylund,K. L.,Asparouhov, T., andMuthén, B.O. (2007). Deciding on the number of
classes in latent class analysis and growthmixturemodeling. Struct. Equ.Modeling
14, 535–569. doi: 10.1080/10705510701575396
Pelham, B. W., and Swann, W. B. Jr. (1989). From self-conceptions to self-worth:
on the sources and structure of global self-esteem. J. Personal. Soc. Psychol. 57,
782–791. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.57.4.672
Raftery, A. E. (1995). Bayesian model selection in social research. Sociol. Methodol.
25, 111–163. doi: 10.2307/271063
Robinson, O. C., Lopez, F., Ramos, K., and Nartova, S. (2013). Authen-
ticity, social context and wellbeing in the USA, England, and Russia: a
three country comparative analysis. J. Cross Cult. Psychol. 44, 719–737. doi:
10.1177/0022022112465672
Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the Adolescent Self-Image. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Rosenbloom, S. (2011). Authentic? Get real. New York Times, 11th September.
Schwartz, G. (1978). Estimating the dimension of a model. Ann. Stat. 6, 461–464.
doi: 10.1214/aos/1176344136
Sedikides, C. (1992). Changes in the valence of the self as a function of mood. Rev.
Personal. Soc. Psychol. 14, 271–311.
Sedikides, C., and Green, J. D. (2009). Memory as a self-protective mechanism.
Soc. Personal. Psychol. Compass 3, 1055–1068. doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2009.
00220.x
Sheldon, K. M., Elliot, A. J., Kim, Y., and Kasser, T. (2001). What’s satisfying about
satisfying events? Comparing ten candidate psychological needs. J. Personal. Soc.
Psychol. 80, 325–339. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.80.2.325
Sheldon, K. M., Ryan, R. M., Rawsthorne, L. J., and Ilardi, B. (1997). Trait self and
true self: cross-role variation in the Big-Five personality traits and its relations
with psychological authenticity and subjectivewell-being. J. Personal. Soc. Psychol.
73, 1380–1393. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.73.6.1380
Sherman, R. A., Nave, C. S., and Funder, D. C. (2012). Properties of persons and
situations related to overall and distinctive personality-behavior congruence. J.
Res. Personal. 46, 87–101. doi: 10.1016/j.jrp.2011.12.006
Slabu, L., Lenton, A. P., Bruder, M., and Sedikides, C. (in press). A cross-cultural
investigation of trait and state authenticity. J. Cross Cult. Psychol.
Frontiers in Psychology | Personality and Social Psychology July 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 770 | 8
Lenton et al. A typology of (in)authenticity experiences
Thompson, E. R. (2007). Development and validation of an interna-
tionally reliable short-form of the positive and negative affect schedule
(PANAS). J. Cross Cult. Psychol. 38, 227–242. doi: 10.1177/00220221062
97301
Triandis, H. C. (1995). Individualism and Collectivism. Boulder, CO:Westview Press.
Turner, R., and Billings, V. (1991). “The social context of self-feeling,”
in The Self-Society Dynamic: Cognition, Emotion, and Action, eds
J. Howard and P. Callero (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press),
103–122.
Van Vaerenbergh, Y., and Thomas, T. D. (2013). Response styles: a literature review
of antecedents, consequences and remedies. Int. J. Public Opin. Res. 25, 195–217.
doi: 10.1093/ijpor/eds021
Wood, A. M., Linley, P. A., Maltby, J., Baliousis, M., and Joseph, S. (2008). The
authentic personality: a theoretical and empirical conceptualization, and the
development of the Authenticity Scale. J. Counsel. Psychol. 55, 385–399. doi:
10.1037/0022-0167.55.3.385
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the researchwas conducted
in the absence of any commercial or ﬁnancial relationships that could be construed
as a potential conﬂict of interest.
Received: 16 September 2013; accepted: 01 July 2014; published online: 15 July 2014.
Citation: Lenton AP, Slabu L, Bruder M and Sedikides C (2014) Identifying differences
in the experience of (in)authenticity: a latent class analysis approach. Front. Psychol.
5:770. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00770
This article was submitted to Personality and Social Psychology, a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology.
Copyright © 2014 Lenton, Slabu, Bruder and Sedikides. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative CommonsAttribution License (CCBY). The
use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original
author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited,
in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is
permitted which does not comply with these terms.
www.frontiersin.org July 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 770 | 9
